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In this work we analyze consistency for allocation rules in communication situations.
More precisely we characterize the rules proposed by Myerson [R.B. Myerson, Graphs
and cooperation in games, Math. Oper. Res. 2, 1977, 225–229; R.B. Myerson, Conference
structures and fair allocation rules, Internat J. Game Theory 9 (1980) 169–182] by means
of this property.
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1. Introduction
Communication plays a significant role in many economic situations. Communication allows one to discuss possible
joint plans and sign conclusive compromises. Game Theory provides a useful tool for understanding how the individuals
involved in such situations reach an ultimate agreement. For this, several models have been proposed in the literature. For
bibliographies on this issuewe refer the reader to Slikker and van den Nouweland [7], Dutta and Jackson [1], and Jackson [4].
The basic model to analyze cooperation in cooperative contexts was proposed byMyerson [5]. In this model cooperation
was modeled throughout graphs on the set of players. Later on, Myerson [6] considered the case in which the players in
a cooperative game meet together in coalitions or conferences to hold cooperative plans. In the particular case in which a
conference structure is formed by conferences with exactly two players, this conference structure turns out to be a graph.
Myerson [6] characterized an allocation rule which determines a payoff allocation for each possible family of conferences
or conference structure. The restriction of the Myerson rule [6] to communication graph situations coincides precisely with
the rule defined and characterized in Myerson [5] for communication graph situations. Another variation of the basic model
using reward communication situations can be found in Slikker and van den Nouweland [7].
In this work we study the consistency property for allocation rules when communication is given by a conference
structure. Consistencymeans that a rule should be invariantwhen considered by a subgroup of individuals. This property has
played an important role in the characterizations of several rules in cooperative game theory (for a comprehensive survey
see Thomson, [8]). Here we give an alternative characterization of the Myerson rule [6] by means of consistency. For this
we have to define both the reduced game and the reduced conference structure in order to study consistency for allocation
rules. We define also a potential since it will be a useful tool, as in the case of the Shapley value in Hart and Mas-Colell [3].
Needless to say, our study is also valid for the particular case of communication graph situations.
Thework has the following structure. After the introduction and preliminaries, in Section 3we define a cooperative game
based on a definition of connectedness, and we prove that the Shapley value of this cooperative game gives the allocation of
theMyerson rule. In Section 4we define a potential function that will be used later in Section 5, where we study consistency
for allocation rules. For this we define a concept of reduced game and reduced conference structure, and we characterize
the Myerson rule.
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2. Preliminaries
Let U be a set of potential players. A coalition is a finite subset of U .
Following Myerson [6], a conference is any finite set of players who might meet together to discuss their cooperative
plans. And a conference structure is a pair (N,Q ) where N is a coalition and Q is any collection of conferences with players
in N . We will denote by CN the set of all conference structures with players in N , that is
CN = {(N,Q ) : ∀S ∈ Q , S ⊆ N and |S| ≥ 2} .
We say that a sequence of conferences
{
S0, S1, . . . , SK
}
is a chain if Sk ∩ Sk+1 6= ∅ for every k = 0, . . . , K − 1.
Given a conference structure (N,Q ), players i, j ∈ N are connected by (N,Q ) if i = j or there exists a chain{
S0, S1, . . . , SK
} ⊆ Q such that i ∈ S0 and j ∈ SK .
Therefore, two players are connected if they coordinate in some conference in Q or in an overlapping sequence of
conferences inQ inwhich themembers in common serve as intermediaries. The notion of connectedness induces a partition
on N which groups players if they are connected. This partition will be denoted by N/Q .
N/Q = {{j : i and j are connected by (N,Q )} : i ∈ N} .
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N is a coalition and v is a function which maps every coalition S ⊆ N to a real
number v(S), satisfying v(∅) = 0. We will denote by G the set of all cooperative games with players in U . Given a game
(N, v) and a coalition S ⊆ N , we write (S, v) for the subgame obtained by restricting v to the subsets of S.
A value is any function ϕ : G→ ⋃ N⊂U :
N finite
RN satisfying ϕ(N, v) ∈ RN . The Shapley value of the game (N, v) is defined for
every i ∈ N by
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N:
i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n! [v(S)− v (S \ {i})] ,
where n and s are the cardinalities of N and S respectively.
The Shapley value was characterized by Hart and Mas-Colell [3] by means of a consistency property and requiring the
value to be standard for two-person games.
To obtain this characterization these authors employed the notion of potential.
A function P : G→ Rwith P (∅, v) = 0 is a potential if for all (N, v) ∈ G∑
i∈N
DiP(N, v) = v(N),
where DiP(N, v) = P(N, v)− P (N \ {i}, v) .
Theorem 1 (Hart and Mas-Colell, [3]). There exists a unique potential P. Moreover, DiP(N, v) = Shi(N, v) for every i ∈ N.
Let ϕ be a value, (N, v) a game and T ⊆ N . The reduced game of v with respect to T is defined as follows:
v
ϕ
T (S) = v
(
S ∪ T C)−∑
i∈TC
ϕi
(
S ∪ T C , v) (1)
for every S ⊆ T , where T C denotes the complementary of T in N . The value ϕ is consistent if for every game (N, v) and every
coalition T ⊆ N
ϕi
(
T , vϕT
) = ϕi (N, v) for every i ∈ T .
And ϕ is standard for two-person games if
ϕi ({i, j} , v) = v ({i})+ 1
2
· (v ({i, j})− v ({i})− v ({j}))
for all i 6= j and all v.
Theorem 2 (Hart and Mas-Colell, [3]). A value ϕ is the Shapley value if and only if ϕ is consistent and standard for two-person
games.
A communication situation is a triple (N, v,Q ), where (N, v) is a cooperative game and (N,Q ) is a conference structure.
Let CSU denote the set of all communication situations.
An allocation rule is any function Ψ : CSU → ⋃ N⊂U :
N finite
RN satisfying Ψ (N, v,Q ) ∈ RN . The vector Ψ (N, v,Q ) represents
the expectations of the players with respect to their payoffs in the game (N, v), when players communicate according to
the conference structure (N,Q ).
Myerson [6] requires the following property when he defines an allocation rule:
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Component efficiency:∑
i∈T
Ψ i(N, v,Q ) = v(T ) for every T ∈ N/Q . (2)
Given a conference structure (N,Q ) and S ⊆ N we denote
QS = {T : T ∈ Q and T ⊆ S}. (3)
An allocation rule Ψ satisfies the Shapley formula if:
Ψ i(N, v,Q )− Ψ i(N, v,∅) =
∑
S⊆N:
i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
W (N, v,QS)−W
(
N, v,QS\{i}
)]
,
for every i ∈ N , where
W (N, v,Q ) =
∑
j∈N
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) for every Q ∈ CN .
On the other hand, an allocation rule Ψ is fair if:
Ψ i(N, v,Q )− Ψ i (N, v,Q \ {S}) = Ψ j(N, v,Q )− Ψ j (N, v,Q \ {S})
for every i, j ∈ N and every S ∈ Q . Observe that this property requires all players in a conference to gain (or lose) the same
if this conference disappears.
Myerson [6] proves the following theorem (actually, this is a part of the theorem):
Theorem 3. There exists a unique fair allocation rule that satisfies component efficiency. And this allocation rule is the only one
that satisfies component efficiency and the Shapley formula.
We will call this rule theMyerson rule and it will be denoted by Y .
3. The Myerson allocation rule
In this section we will show that the Myerson rule of a communication situation coincides with the Shapley value of a
specific cooperative game. To define this gameweneed the concept of connectedness in a coalition by a conference structure.
Given a conference structure (N,Q ), players i, j ∈ S ⊆ N are connected in S by (N,Q ) if i = j or there exists a chain{
S0, S1, . . . , SK
} ⊆ Q , such that i ∈ S0, j ∈ SK , and Sk ⊆ S for k = 0, . . . , K .
That is, two players are connected in S by (N,Q ), if these players belong to a conference included in S or they coordinate
by overlapping conferences all of them included in S. Obviously, if S = N we have Myerson’s definition of connectedness.
This notion of connectedness induces a partition on every coalition S which groups players if they are connected in S. We
denote this partition by S/Q , that is
S/Q = {{j ∈ S : i and j are connected in S by (N,Q )} : i ∈ S} .
Given a communication situation (N, v,Q ), we define the game (N, v/Q ) for every S ⊆ N by
(v/Q ) (S) =
∑
T∈S/Q
v(T ). (4)
This game represents the game that results from v when players can only communicate through the conferences in Q .
Theorem 4. For every (N, v,Q )
Y (N, v,Q ) = Sh(N, v/Q ).
So, the payoff allocation of a player in (N, v,Q ) given by the Myerson rule coincides with the Shapley value of that player in
(N, v/Q ).
Proof. Taking into account Theorem 3we only have to prove that the allocation rule Z defined by Z(N, v,Q ) = Sh (N, v/Q )
for every (N, v,Q ), is fair and satisfies component efficiency. Let us prove first Z is fair. Let (N, v,Q ) and S ∈ Q , and consider
the gamew defined by
w (T ) = (v/Q ) (T )− (v/ (Q \ {S})) (T ) =
∑
R∈T/Q
v (R)−
∑
R∈T/(Q\{S})
v (R) .
If S 6⊆ T then T/Q = T/ (Q \ {S}), and therefore w (T ) = 0. Symmetry of the Shapley value implies Shi (w) = Shj (w)
for all i, j ∈ S. And taking also into account linearity of the Shapley value
Shi (N, v/Q )− Shi (N, v/ (Q \ {S})) = Shi (w) = Shj (w) = Shj (N, v/Q )− Shj (N, v/ (Q \ {S})) ,
that is, Z is fair.
4972 M.J. Albizuri, J.M. Zarzuelo / Discrete Mathematics 309 (2009) 4969–4976
Now letN/Q = {T1, . . . , Tm} and vk (S) = (v/Q ) (S ∩ Tk) for k = 1, . . . ,m and S ⊆ N . Since S/Q =⋃Tk∈N/Q (S ∩ Tk) /Q ,
then v/Q =∑mk=1 vk. Let us fix Tk. Taking into account that i ∈ Tk is a null player in vk′ if k′ 6= k and that the Shapley value
satisfies the null player axiom,∑
i∈Tk
Z i(N, v,Q ) =
∑
i∈Tk
Shi(N, v/Q ) =
∑
i∈Tk
Shi(N, vk)
= vk (N) = (v/Q ) (Tk) = v (Tk) ,
where in the second equality we have also taken into account linearity of the Shapley value and in the third equality
efficiency. Hence, we have proved Z satisfies component efficiency.
Remark 1. In van den Nouweland et al. [9] the authors work with hypergraph communication situations. Notice that the
interaction components of their work coincide with the components S/Q in this work, and the ‘‘extended Myerson value’’
they define is precisely Y .
4. Potential and conference structures
Similarly to cooperative games we can define a notion of potential for communication situations. This notion will be
useful later in the next section.
Let PCS : CSU → R be a function that maps every communication situation (N, v,Q ) to a real number PCS(N, v,Q ). The
marginal contribution of a player i ∈ N in the communication situation (N, v,Q ) is defined as
DiPCS(N, v,Q ) = PCS(N, v,Q )− PCS (N \ {i}, v,QN\{i}) .
A function PCS : CSU → R with PCS(∅, v,Q ) = 0 is called a CS-potential function if it satisfies the following condition
for every (N, v,Q ) ∈ CSU∑
i∈N
DiPCS(N, v,Q ) = (v/Q ) (N). (5)
Theorem 5. There is a unique CS-potential function PCS , and it satisfies PCS(N, v,Q ) = P(N, v/Q ).
Proof. Expression (5) can be rewritten as
PCS(N, v,Q ) = 1|N| ·
[
(v/Q ) (N)+
∑
i∈N
PCS
(
N \ {i}, v,QN\{i}
)]
.
Since PCS(∅, v,Q ) = 0, PCS(N, v,Q ) is uniquely determined. Now, let us prove the potential PCS satisfies PCS(N, v,Q ) =
P(N, v/Q ). Let F : CSU → R be the function defined by F(N, v,Q ) = P(N, v/Q ). The definition of F and(
N \ {i}, v/QN\{i}
) = (N \ {i}, v/Q ) imply
F
(
N \ {i}, v,QN\{i}
) = P (N \ {i}, v/QN\{i}) = P (N \ {i}, v/Q ) .
And taking into account F(N, v,Q ) = P(N, v/Q )we have that F satisfies (5) if and only if
P(N, v/Q ) = 1|N| ·
[
(v/Q ) (N)+
∑
i∈N
P (N \ {i}, v/Q )
]
,
which is true by Theorem 1. Therefore F is the CS-potential. 
Corollary 6. DiPCS(N, v,Q ) = Y i(N, v,Q ) for every i ∈ N.
Proof. We have that
DiPCS(N, v,Q ) = DiP(N, v/Q ) = Shi(N, v/Q ) = Y i(N, v,Q ).
The first equality holds by Theorem 5 and v/Q = v/QN\{i}, the second by Theorem 1, and the third by Theorem 4. 
5. Consistency and conference structures
As it has been mentioned in the Introduction, the way to design rules has been the formulation of reasonable properties
that may be sound to require. A property that has played a significant role in the axiomatization of values has been
consistency. Consistency can be roughly described as follows. Let σ be a rule applied to a specific game. This value is said
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to be consistent if whenever a subgroup of agents is paid according to σ and leaves the others in a reduced game, then the
payoffs of the remaining agents do not change in the new situation. Different consistency properties clearly depend on the
definition of the reduced problem.
In this section we characterize the Myerson rule by means of consistency. Since the Myerson rule is a generalization of
the Shapley value when there are communication conference structures, it seems reasonable to modify the reduced game
in expression (1) to obtain the appropriate reduced game for the Myerson rule. Moreover, in this case we have to define the
reduced conference structure.
Given an allocation rule Ψ : CSU → ⋃ N⊂U :
N finite
RN , T ⊆ N and (N,Q ) ∈ CN , the reduced game
(
T , vΨ ,QT
)
is defined as
follows
v
Ψ ,Q
T (S) = (v/Q )
(
S ∪ T C)−∑
i∈TC
Ψ i
(
S ∪ T C , v,QS∪TC
)
, (6)
for every S ⊆ T , where T C is the complementary of T in N . T C represents the players who leave the game. So, the worth
of a subset S is equal to what this subset can obtain with players who leave the game when players communicate through
conferences in Q , minus what players outside T are given in this situation (that is, when they are with S and communicate
through conferences in Q ).
Given a conference structure (N,Q ), let T ⊆ N represent the players that remain in the game. Define the reduced
conference structure
(
T , Q̂ T
)
by
Q̂ T = QT ∪
{(
K⋃
k=0
T k
)
∩ T : {T 0, T 1, . . . , T K} ⊆ Q is a chain such that K⋃
k=0
T k 6⊆ T and
∣∣∣∣∣
(
K⋃
k=0
T k
)
∩ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
}
. (7)
Hence, the conferences of Q̂ T are those already contained in T and conferences formed by players of T that were connected
by a chain with some player outside T .
Given a communication situation (N, v,Q ) and T ⊆ N , the reduced communication situation is defined by
(
T , vΨ ,QT , Q̂ T
)
where vΨ ,QT and Q̂ T are defined in (6) and (7).
We say that the rule Ψ is CS-consistent if for every communication situation (N, v,Q ) and every coalition T ⊆ N,
Ψ i
(
T , vΨ ,QT , Q̂ T
)
= Ψ i (N, v,Q ) for every i ∈ T .
That is, as in the case of cooperative games, an allocation rule is CS-consistent if the players that remain in the reduced
communication situation have the same allocations as in the original communication situation.
And we also have to define standardness for two-person games when there are conference structures. The rule Ψ is said
to be CS-standard for two-person games if
Ψ i ({i, j} , v,Q ) =
{
v ({i})+ 1
2
· (v ({i, j})− v ({i})− v ({j})) if {i, j} ∈ Q
v ({i}) if {i, j} 6∈ Q .
That is, if the two players do not communicate in any conference they obtain their worth and if they communicate they
obtain just the standard value in two-person games.
Now we are going to characterize the Myerson rule by means of these two properties. For it we need some lemmas.
First notice that a value ψ for cooperative games induces an allocation rule Ψ ψ for communication situations via the
game v/Q , defined by
Ψ ψ (N, v,Q ) = ψ(N, v/Q ),
e.g., the Shapley value induces theMyerson rule as it is shown in Theorem4 (observe that not every allocation rule is induced
by a cooperative value.) For these ‘‘induced’’ rules the equality vΨ
ψ ,Q
T /Q̂ T = (v/Q )ψT is not true in general, but we have the
following result for the Myerson rule that will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 7. For every S ⊆ T
v
Y ,Q
T /Q̂ T (S) = (v/Q )ShT (S).
Proof. We need to prove that
v
Y ,Q
T /Q̂ T (S) = vY ,QT (S) for every S ⊆ T . (8)
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By expressions (4) and (6),
v
Y ,Q
T /Q̂ T (S) =
∑
R∈S/Q̂T
v
Y ,Q
T (R)
=
∑
R∈S/Q̂ T
[
(v/Q )
(
R ∪ T C)−∑
i∈TC
Y i
(
R ∪ T C , v,QR∪TC
)]
.
And by Theorem 4 and efficiency of the Shapley value we have that
v
Y ,Q
T /Q̂ T (S) =
∑
R∈S/Q̂ T
[
(v/Q )
(
R ∪ T C)−∑
i∈TC
Shi
(
R ∪ T C , v/Q )]
=
∑
R∈S/Q̂ T
[∑
i∈R
Shi
(
R ∪ T C , v/Q )] .
Since R ∈ S/Q̂ T if and ony if R = S ∩ R′ with R′ ∈ (S ∪ T C) /Q then
v
Y ,Q
T /Q̂ T (S) =
∑
S∩R′ :
R′∈(S∪TC)/Q
[∑
i∈S∩R′
Shi
((
S ∩ R′) ∪ T C , v/Q )] .
Taking also into account the definition of vY ,QT (S), equality (8) will be proved if∑
S∩R′ :
R′∈(S∪TC)/Q
[∑
i∈S∩R′
Shi
((
S ∩ R′) ∪ T C , v/Q )] =∑
i∈S
Shi
(
S ∪ T C , v/Q ) .
Let us prove that Shi
((
S ∩ R′) ∪ T C , v/Q ) = Shi (S ∪ T C , v/Q ) for every i ∈ S ∩ R′ with R′ ∈ (S ∪ T C) /Q . Let
R′ ∈ (S ∪ T C) /Q and i ∈ S ∩ R′. We have that i ∈ R′ ∈ ((S ∩ R′) ∪ T C) /Q and, as in Theorem 4, if we define
vk
(
S ′
) = (v/Q ) (S ′ ∩ R′)we have that
Shi
(
S ∪ T C , v/Q ) = Shi (S ∪ T C , vk)
and
Shi
((
S ∩ R′) ∪ T C , v/Q ) = Shi ((S ∩ R′) ∪ T C , vk) .
Since R′ is a carrier of vk, then
Shi
(
S ∪ T C , vk
) = Shi (R′, vk) = Shi ((S ∩ R′) ∪ T C , vk) ,
and therefore
Shi
(
(S ∩ R′) ∪ T C , v/Q ) = Shi(S ∪ T C , v/Q ),
and the proof is complete. 
Lemma 8. The Myerson rule is CS-consistent and CS-standard for two-person games.
Proof. It is clear that the Myerson rule Y is CS-standard for two-person games. And taking into account Theorems 2 and 4,
and Lemma 7 the rule Y is CS-consistent. 
Lemma 9. If an allocation rule is CS-consistent and CS-standard for two-person games then it satisfies component efficiency.
Proof. Let Ψ be an allocation rule which is CS-consistent and CS-standard for two-person games, and let us prove Ψ is
component efficient, that is,∑
i∈T
Ψ i(N, v,Q ) = v(T ) for every T ∈ N/Q . (9)
If |N| = 2, equality (9) is true since Ψ is CS-standard for two-person games. If |N| ≥ 3, assume (9) is true if the number
of players in the game is less than n.
If |N| = n, let T ∈ N/Q and i ∈ T . CS-consistency implies∑
j∈T
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) =
∑
j∈T\{i}
Ψ j
(
N \ {i} , vΨ ,QN\{i}, Q̂ N\{i}
)
+ Ψ i(N, v,Q ).
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Since |N \ {i}| < n and T \ {i} ∈ N \ {i} /Q̂ N\{i} then induction implies∑
j∈T
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = vΨ ,QN\{i} (T \ {i})+ Ψ i(N, v,Q ).
Therefore,∑
j∈T
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = (v/Q ) (T )− Ψ i(T , v,QT )+ Ψ i(N, v,Q ).
Since T ∈ N/Q then (v/Q ) (T ) = v (T ) , and the equality above can be rewritten as follows,∑
j∈T
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = v (T )− Ψ i(T , v,QT )+ Ψ i(N, v,Q ). (10)
If N/Q = {N}, then T = N and (10) implies∑
j∈N
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = v (N) .
That is, (9) is satisfied.
If N/Q 6= {N}, then T 6= N . By adding all the equalities in expression (10) for i ∈ T we have
|T | ·
∑
j∈T
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = |T | · v (T )−
∑
i∈T
Ψ i(T , v,QT )+
∑
i∈T
Ψ i(N, v,Q ).
And by induction,
|T | ·
∑
j∈T
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = |T | · v (T )− v (T )+
∑
i∈T
Ψ i(N, v,Q ).
Simplifying,∑
j∈T
Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = v(T ),
and (9) is obtained.
So it remains to consider the case n = 1, that is, N = {i}, and we have to prove Ψ i({i} , v,∅) = v ({i}). Let j 6= i and
consider ({i, j} , v,Q ) where v ({i, j}) = v ({i}) = v ({i}) and v ({j}) = 0, and Q = {i, j}. Since Ψ is CS-standard for two-
person games Ψ i({i, j} , v,Q ) = v ({i}) and Ψ j({i, j} , v,Q ) = 0. Therefore, vΨ ,Q{i} ({i}) = v ({i}) − 0, that is, vΨ ,Q{i} = v. And
applying CS-consistency,
v ({i}) = Ψ i ({i, j} , v,Q ) = Ψ i
(
{i} , vΨ ,Q{i} ,Q
)
= Ψ i ({i} , v,∅)
and the proof is complete. 
Theorem 10. An allocation rule Ψ is CS-consistent and CS-standard for two-person games if and only if Ψ = Y .
Proof. By Lemma 8 only the uniqueness part remains.
Let Ψ be a CS-consistent allocation rule that is also CS-standard for two-person games. By Lemma 9, Ψ is component
efficient. Now, we will show that Ψ has a CS-potential.
Define the function F as follows on the set of all communication situations (N, v,Q )where N has at most two players:
F(∅, v,∅) = 0,
F({i} , v,∅) = v({i}),
F({i, j} , v,Q ) =
{1
2
· [v ({i})+ v ({j})+ v ({i, j})] if Q = {i, j}
v ({i})+ v ({j}) if Q = ∅.
It is easy to check that for i = 1, 2
Ψ i(N, v,Q ) = F(N, v,Q )− F (N \ {i} , v,QN\{i}) (11)
if |N| = 1, 2 and i ∈ N . Now let us extend F to all communication situations (N, v,Q ) in such a way that (11) holds. This
and expression (9) will imply F is the CS-potential and by Corollary 6 then Ψ = Y .
We will apply induction on |N|. Suppose F is defined and satisfies (11) if |N| < n. Now suppose |N| = n. We have to
prove Ψ i(N, v,Q )+ F(N \ {i} , v,QN\{i}) is constant for i ∈ N . Let j, k ∈ N \ {i}, j 6= k.
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Applying CS-consistency and expression (11),
Ψ i(N, v,Q )− Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = Ψ i
(
N \ {k} , vΨ ,QN\{k}, Q̂ N\{k}
)
− Ψ j
(
N \ {k} , vΨ ,QN\{k}, Q̂ N\{k}
)
=
[
F(N \ {k} , vΨ ,QN\{k}, Q̂ N\{k} )− F
(
N \ {i, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{i,k}
)]
−
[
F(N \ {k} , vΨ ,QN\{k}, Q̂ N\{k} )− F
(
N \ {j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{j,k}
)]
=
[
F
(
N \ {j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{j,k}
)
− F
(
N \ {i, j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{i,j,k}
)]
−
[
F
(
N \ {i, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{i,k}
)
− F
(
N \ {i, j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{i,j,k}
)]
= Ψ i
(
N \ {j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{j,k}
)
− Ψ j
(
N \ {i, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k},
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{i,k}
)
.
Taking into account that
(
N \ {j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k}
)
=
(
N \ {j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{j}N\{j,k}
)
and
(
N \ {i, k} , vΨ ,QN\{k}
)
=
(
N \ {i, k} , vΨ ,QN\{i}N\{i,k}
)
,
we conclude that
Ψ i(N, v,Q )− Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = Ψ i
(
N \ {j, k} , vΨ ,QN\{j}N\{j,k} ,
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{j,k}
)
−Ψ j
(
N \ {i, k} , vΨ ,QN\{i}N\{i,k} ,
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{i,k}
)
.
Moreover since
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{j,k} = ̂
(
QN\{j}
)N\{j,k}
and
(
Q̂ N\{k}
)
N\{i,k} = ̂
(
QN\{i}
)N\{i,k}
, by CS-consistency and (11) the above
equality implies
Ψ i(N, v,Q )− Ψ j(N, v,Q ) = Ψ i (N \ {j} , v,QN\{j})− Ψ j (N \ {i} , v,QN\{i})
= [F (N \ {j} , v,QN\{j})− F (N \ {i, j} , v,QN\{i,j})]
− [F (N \ {i} , v,QN\{i})− F (N \ {i, j} , v,QN\{i,j})]
= F (N \ {j} , v,QN\{j})− F (N \ {i} , v,QN\{i}) ,
and the proof is complete. 
Remark 2. It is interesting to consider consistency in graph communication situations, that is, when the conferences have
exactly two members. In this case the conference {i, j} will be denoted by the link i : j. Now a chain is just a sequence
(i0, i1, . . . , iK ). Given a graph communication situation (N, v,Q ) then
(
T , Q̂ T
)
is not a graph since
∣∣∣(⋃Kk=0 T k) ∩ T ∣∣∣ in the
definition of Q̂ T can be greater than 2. But just requiring
∣∣∣(⋃Kk=0 T k) ∩ T ∣∣∣ = 2 we would have a conference structure that
is a graph since{(
K⋃
k=0
T k
)
∩ T : {T 0, T 1, . . . , T K} ⊆ Q is a chain such that K⋃
k=0
T k 6⊆ T and
∣∣∣∣∣
(
K⋃
k=0
T k
)
∩ T
∣∣∣∣∣ = 2
}
= {i0 : iK | i0, iK ∈ T , (i0, i1, . . . , iK ) ⊆ Q is a chain such that ik 6∈ T , k = 0, . . . , K − 1} .
Hamiache [2] employed another consistency property to characterize a rule different from the Myerson one [5].
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